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Abstract 
Parallel with the evolving of cyber conflicts, the need for appropriate handling of the public 
administration tasks also appeared. Governmental tasks were necessary, which includes defense 
(military), diplomatic, law enforcement and public administrative factors also.  
This paper shows an analysis of the institutional background of cybersecurity administration in the 
European Union and Hungary in parallel. This includes the regulations about ENISA, the European 
Union Cybersecurity Agency, the Hungarian cybersecurity authorities, and the cybersecurity 
strategies for both entities, namely Regulation (EC) No 460/2004, Cybersecurity Strategy of the 
European Union of 2017, Regulation (EU) 526/2013, COM/2016/0410 final, 2017/0225 (COD) 
Proposal, Hungarian Government decree no. 223/2009, Government Decision no. 1139/2013, Act L 
of 2013, and Government Decree 187/2015. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The word cybersecurity seems to be a bit overused nowadays, but as other researchers already 
shown, it is different from the “classical” term information security. In both terms, information-
based assets stored or transmitted using information and communication technologies (ICT) is 
included. But information security also includes paper-based information. The term cybersecurity 
includes non-information based assets (e.g., a high-voltage substation) that are vulnerable to threats 
via ICT. This is similar to the interdependency between critical infrastructure elements).3 The new 
model of cybersecurity needs a different approach to security organization: the classical security 
models have to be revised.4 
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The importance of cybersecurity is well-known and often communicated by decision makers. 
However, the implementation, preparedness, and knowledge have deficiencies. This might happen 
because of lack of knowledge, resources or experience. 
Technology development, as we described above, made local system security improvements 
indispensable.5 In case of e-government systems, a higher level of the problem also exists: attack 
against multiple systems or against a full infrastructure. This can take part of a conventional war, as 
cyberwar or may be an unconventional event, called cyberterrorist attack; they are all part of 
cybersecurity. Thus a major part of cybersecurity can be only handled with governmental or 
supranational level, with cybersecurity strategies,6 legal regulation, and dedicated authorities. 
Table 1 shows the changes in the EU and in Hungary parallelly, which will be detailed in this 
article. 
 
 
Year The European Union Hungary 
2004 Regulation on establishing 
ENISA 
 
2012  National Security Strategy 
2013 EU Cybersecurity Strategy 
The new regulation on ENISA 
National Cybersecurity Strategy 
Governmental Information Security 
Act 
2016 NIS directive  
2017 Cybersecurity Act (proposal) National Cybersecurity Strategy 
(change proposal according to NIS) 
Table 1: Legal regulations about cybersecurity in the EU and Hungary 
 
The topic of cybersecurity administration addresses the Danube Region Strategy’s PA 10 
Institutional Capacity & Cooperation and PA 11 Security priority areas. Priority Area 11 Target I - 
Security offensive - Enhancing police cooperation with the aim of improving security and tackling 
serious and organised crime in the EU Strategy for the Danube Region (EUSDR) countries and 
strengthening the efforts against terrorism threats includes the third action: To intensify the 
cooperation in combating the Internet crimes (cybercrime). 
 
2. Cybersecurity strategy in the EU 
 
 
Before forming any exact strategy, Regulation (EC) No 460/2004 of the European Parliament and 
of the Council of 10 March 2004 establishing the European Network and Information Security 
Agency came into force. The regulation established ENISA, with the following objectives: 
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• The Agency shall enhance the capability of the Community, the Member States and, as a 
consequence, the business community to prevent, address and to respond to network and 
information security problems. 
• The Agency shall provide assistance and deliver advice to the Commission and the Member 
States on issues related to network and information security falling within its competencies 
as set out in this Regulation. 
• Building on national and Community efforts, the Agency shall develop a high level of 
expertise. The Agency shall use this expertise to stimulate broad cooperation between actors 
from the public and private sectors. 
• The Agency shall assist the Commission, where called upon, in the technical preparatory 
work for updating and developing Community legislation in the field of network and 
information security. 
It is important to remark the verbs used: enhance, provide, develop, and update. They show us the 
aim to form a soft agency without policy-making power. The exact plans with ENISA were also 
unclear.7 
The tasks aligned with the objectives above were the followings: 
• collect appropriate information to analyze current and emerging risks 
• provide advice to stakeholders 
• enhance cooperation between different actors 
• facilitate cooperation the Commission and the Member States 
• contribute to awareness raising  
• assist the Commission and the Member States in their dialogue with industry 
• track the development of standards  
• advise the Commission on research  
• promote risk assessment activities,  
• contribute to Community efforts to cooperate with third countries  
• express its own conclusions independently,  
 
 
As we see from the list above, the tasks are supportive functions. There are no regulatory, 
standardization or audit functions dedicated to ENISA. In contrast to the field of data protection, the 
European Data Protection Supervisor has authority to audit EU organizations. 
 
The bodies of ENISA are the Management Board, the Executive Director, and the Permanent 
Stakeholders' Group. 
 
The first official cybersecurity strategy in the European Union was formed with the Joint 
Communication to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social 
Committee and the Committee of the Regions Cybersecurity Strategy of the European Union. It’s 
the Open, Safe and Secure Cyberspace formed on the 7th February 2013. 
The strategy defined five strategic priorities, which address the challenges: 
• Achieving cyber resilience 
• Drastically reducing cybercrime 
• Developing cyber defense policy and capabilities related to the Common Security and 
Defence Policy (CSDP) 
• Develop the industrial and technological resources for cybersecurity 
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• Establish a coherent international cyberspace policy for the European Union and promote 
core EU values 
In the first strategic priority, achieving cyber resilience, the need to modernize and strengthen 
ENISA was articulated.8 
After nine years of ENISA’s operation and providing nearly 300 publications, with focus topics 
incident- and risk management, critical infrastructure protection, trust services and computing 
cloud, a new regulation came into force. Regulation (EU) No 526/2013 of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 21st May 2013 concerning the European Union Agency for Network and 
Information Security (ENISA) and repealing Regulation (EC) No 460/2004 has changed the 
objectives: 
• The Agency shall develop and maintain a high level of expertise. 
• The Agency shall assist the Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies in developing 
policies in network and information security. 
• The Agency shall assist the Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies and the Member 
States in implementing the policies necessary to meet the legal and regulatory requirements 
of network and information security under existing and future legal acts of the Union, thus 
contributing to the proper functioning of the internal market. 
• The Agency shall assist the Union and the Member States in enhancing and strengthening 
their capability and preparedness to prevent, detect and respond to network and information 
security problems and incidents. 
• The Agency shall use its expertise to stimulate broad cooperation between actors from the 
public and private sectors. 
The tasks were also changed according to the objectives: 
• support the development of Union policy and law, by advising, providing preparatory work, 
analyzing  
• support capability building by supporting the Member States, promoting voluntary 
cooperation, assisting by supporting the operation of a Computer Emergency Response 
Team (CERT) for them; 
• supporting the raising of the level of capabilities of national/governmental and Union 
CERTs, including by promoting dialogue and exchange of information, with a view to 
ensuring that, with regard to state of the art, each CERT meets a common set of minimum 
capabilities and operates according to best practices; 
• support voluntary cooperation  
• cooperate with Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies,  
• contribute to the Union’s efforts to cooperate with third countries and international 
organizations  
The most important change in the tasks was the establishment of CERT-EU,9 as a new service, and 
also a part of Computer Security Incident Response Teams (CSIRT) network according to NIS 
directive.10 Incident management became more important in the operation of ENISA with these 
changes than in 2004. The incident management theory and practice are very wide; they include the 
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range from operational procedures to governmental response. Illustrative key topics are ISO/IEC 
27035, ITIL-based incident response, forensics, and operation of CSIRTs.11 
The only change in the organization was the staff’s addition to the Executive Director, and the 
Management Board shall establish an Executive Board. 
 
In 2016 the European Commission adopted the Commission Communication on Strengthening 
Europe's Cyber Resilience System and Fostering a Competitive and Innovative Cybersecurity 
Industry, COM/2016/0410 final. The document dealt with the making the most of NIS cooperation 
mechanisms and moving towards ENISA 2.0. The section also mentions European Cybercrime 
Centre (EC3) at Europol as a possible cooperation partner. The Commission is required to evaluate 
ENISA by 20 June 2018 but plans to do it earlier. 
So that a future change is foreseeable with the 2017/0225 (COD) Proposal for a Regulation of the 
European Parliament and of the Council on ENISA, the "EU Cybersecurity Agency," and repealing 
Regulation (EU) 526/2013, and on Information and Communication Technology cybersecurity 
certification (''Cybersecurity Act''). The voting is forecasted to June 2018. The objectives of ENISA 
changed slightly: 
• The Agency shall be a center of expertise on cybersecurity by virtue of its independence, the 
scientific and technical quality of the advice and assistance it delivers and the information it 
provides, the transparency of its operating procedures and methods of operation, and its 
diligence in carrying out its tasks. 
• The Agency shall assist the Union institutions, agencies, and bodies, as well as the Member 
States, in developing and implementing policies related to cybersecurity. 
• The Agency shall support capacity building and preparedness across the Union, by assisting 
the Union, Member States and public and private stakeholders in order to increase the 
protection of their network and information systems, develop skills and competencies in the 
field of cybersecurity, and achieve cyber resilience. 
• The Agency shall promote cooperation and coordination at Union level among the Member 
States, Union institutions, agencies and bodies, and relevant stakeholders, including the 
private sector, on matters related to cybersecurity. 
• The Agency shall increase cybersecurity capabilities at Union level in order to complement 
the action of Member States in preventing and responding to cyber threats, notably in the 
event of cross-border incidents. 
• The Agency shall promote the use of certification, including by contributing to the 
establishment and maintenance of a cybersecurity certification framework at Union level in 
accordance with Title III of this Regulation, with a view to increasing transparency of 
cybersecurity assurance of ICT products and services and thus strengthen trust in the digital 
internal market. 
• The Agency shall promote a high level of awareness of citizens and businesses on issues 
related to the cybersecurity. 
The tasks improved heavily: the task list consists of 60 elements, grouped into the following seven 
articles: 
• Tasks relating to the development and implementation of Union policy and law 
• Tasks relating to capacity building 
• Tasks relating to operational cooperation at Union level 
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• Tasks relating to the market, cybersecurity certification, and standardization 
• Tasks relating to knowledge, information and awareness raising 
• Tasks relating to research and innovation 
• Tasks relating to international cooperation 
 
Furthermore, on 13 September 2017, the President of the European Commission, Jean Claude 
Juncker announced an implementation toolkit for the Network and Information Security Directive; 
and a report to ensure an effective response in case of cyber-attacks in the Member States. 
 
3. Cybersecurity organization in Hungary 
 
The first comprehensive security and defense policy system of Hungary after the political change in 
1989 did not recognize cyber threats. Neither the National Assembly resolution no. 94/1998 (XII. 
29.) on the security- and defense policy principles of Republic of Hungary, nor the Government 
resolution no. 2073/2004. (IV. 15.) on the National Security Strategy of the Republic of Hungary, 
nor the Government resolution no. 1009/2009. (I. 30.) on the National Military Strategy of the 
Republic of Hungary included cyber defense as an objective. According to these policies and 
strategies, the defense against cyber attacks was treated individually, even in the legal regulation. 
 
Before the Act on Electronic Public Service (before 29 June 2009) there was no acts dealing with 
information security in public- or governmental networks.12 
 
Only the following Government decrees regulated the field: 
 
• 195/2005 (IX. 22) Government Decree on security, interoperability and uniform use of 
electronic administration systems 
• 84/2007 (IV. 25) Government Decree on security requirements of the Central Electronic 
Service System and related systems 
• 193/2005 (IX. 22) Government Decree on detailed rules for the electronic filing 
• 194/2005 (IX. 22) Government Decree on requirements for electronic signatures and the 
associated certificates used in the administrative proceedings, as well as requirements for 
certification service providers issuing the certificates 
• 182/2007 (VII. 10) on the regulation of the central electronic service provider system 
 
These provided security rules sporadically to some systems, without any general framework. 
 
As a result, we may say that relatively low awareness of the legislator and the business is 
observable in the usage of international IT security standards, despite its significance and the high 
risk in some areas. No obligations were found in acts of Hungarian Parliament for enforcement of 
standards in IT security. There have been built-in self-control procedures in some acts, but in 
practice, those procedures actually haven’t worked efficiently.13 
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In 2009 a small change was commenced with the adoption of Act LX of 2009 on electronic public 
services. It has highlighted the requirement of security as a basic principle.  
 
Organizations providing ICT based public services ensure the publicity of data of public interest 
(according to the Act on data protection and freedom of information) and protection of personal and 
any other data during the provision of services.14 
 
During the provision of services, particular attention must also be paid to the fulfillment of 
realization of information rights, protection of classified information, business secrets and other 
protected data groups. Service providers ensure IT security, including the integrity of electronic 
records, and applicability of the electronic signature technology. The legislator refers to the 
application of electronic signature technology and the importance of compliance with the relevant 
security requirements.  
 
The use of electronic signatures, according to Act on electronic signature (hereinafter Eat.) can 
greatly assist in maintaining the integrity of data. However, a huge discrepancy is noticeable 
between theoretical principles and practice. Despite the above rules, electronic signatures are still 
not widely adopted and rarely used in such systems. 
 
Service providers shall also ensure the operational continuity and enforcement of information 
system collaboration requirements. As we have shown in chapter 4 and chapter 5 interoperability, 
i.e., cooperation between the various systems has particular importance in the government 
information technology, as island-like systems have been developed, and over time the demand of 
integration increased fairly. The negative impact of island-like development is still being felt in the 
area of interoperation. The continuity of operation, as one of the main requirements for IT security, 
including disaster and business continuity planning, is an important feature for large government 
databases, where data loss could and would be catastrophic. 
 
Data transmitted to the central system profiling (analysis of user habits, personal information and 
direct access to meaningful case data) is not allowed according to these regulations. Compliance is 
ensured with the central system operator by means of technical solution. Profiling, one of the most 
challenging privacy issue in recent years is declared to be prohibited by a principle in Act LX of 
2009 on electronic public services, and the information system must ensure this technically (e.g., 
through Privacy by Design technologies). 
 
Use of remote services required a face-to-face pre-registration or an equivalent measure and given 
that a significant number of electronic public services are administrative procedures, they need 
proper identification. Personal appearance and identification mean a registration in governmental 
offices or registration by electronic signature. 
 
Authenticity, quality, operational security and confidentiality of the data processed in electronic 
public services operate under the Central System must comply with defined rules. Here the act 
refers to Government decree no. 223/2009 (X. 14) about the security of electronic public services. 
In that, the requirements and procedures were determined in sections from 11 to 32. Requirements 
set out in the Act are detailed in the following regulations: 
 
• Government Decree 223/2009 (X. 14) on the security of electronic public services 
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• Government Decree 224/2009 (X. 14) on the central electronic system service’s recipient 
identification and authentication services 
• Government Decree 225/2009 (X. 14) on electronic public services and their use 
• Government Decree 78/2010 (III. 25) on requirements of electronic signatures in 
administration and certain rules for electronic communication 
 
There was a bill on information security in 2009, which never came to force, but had a remarkable 
impact on the area.15 The proposal was a draft legislation framework, a so-called lex specialis. 
The bill’s scope was all IT systems and services in the Republic of Hungary, including private 
computers. It would have been applied to the operators and users, also. 
 
According to this information systems are to be divided into 5 separate security level. One of the 
factors of the grouping was storage of personal data. The groups were the followings: 
  
• Level 1: home computer networks and individual computers connected to the Internet 
• Level 2: information systems used by every legal relationship between employer and 
employee, internal IT network, limited internal access non-public electronic 
communications services or internal network or individual computer capable of using public 
electronic services 
• Level 3: any public electronic services that don’t handle, store, process or transfer 
personally identifiable information, including anonymous registration services 
• Level 4: organizations providing public electronic services, application service provider and 
it's public electronic services, regardless of personal data processing; any public electronic 
services that handle, store, process or transfer personally identifiable information 
• Level 5: critical infrastructure sector’s computer system, closed-circuit, and public 
electronic network or services and information technology 
 
One of the most interesting questions is the mandatory audit required at level 4-5 as a mean of 
control. According to the original intention, this control would have been conducted by audit firms 
which are accredited previously by the National Accreditation Body for Certification Activity. 
Creators of the legislation could not specify whether that responsibility belongs to management 
systems or product certification.  
 
Most importantly, the social impact of the law would have been significant, at least because of its 
wide scope. Critics had said there was lack of audit control in level 1 to 3, which made it a 
redundant regulation. In contrast to that, the legislation could have set the level of security 
requirements under other laws, because of its lex specialis character. For example, in Criminal Code 
Section 423 adequate protection is required in the case of hacking, but it was not defined earlier. 
The new law might have given meaningful content to it, and increasing legal certainty. 
 
Government Decision no. 1035/2012 (II.21.) on Hungary's National Security Strategy required the 
strengthening of the security of electronic information systems to enhance the protection of critical 
national information infrastructure, and the development of the adequate cyber defense.  
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Stemming from this statement of the National Security Strategy, the Government adopted the 
Government Decision no. 1139/2013 (III. 21.) on Hungary's National Cybersecurity Strategy. The 
main objective therein: 
• Establish incident reporting mechanisms 
• Establish an incident response capability 
• Engage in international cooperation 
• Strengthen training and educational programs 
• Establish baseline security requirements 
• Organize cyber security exercises 
• Critical Information Infrastructure Protection 
• Develop national cyber contingency plans 
• Establish an institutionalized form of cooperation between public agencies 
 
The legislator took the view that recently experienced cyber wars worldwide justified the coding of 
a modern Hungarian Information Security Act and on 25th April 2013 was a huge milestone for the 
administrative control of information, when Act L of 2013 on the electronic security of state and 
local government organizations was published. 
 
The scope of the act, despite its title and scope definition in Section 2, is significantly wider as it 
seems to be,16 mainly because of the following extensions: data processors of national data assets, 
European critical infrastructure system elements, national critical infrastructure system elements, as 
defined by law. These bodies can significantly extend the scope (even with private companies), so 
typically the public utility providers, electronic communications services, financial organizations 
could be included. An itemized list has not been published at the time of writing this manuscript. 
The law prescribes the essential items known as CIA triad (confidentiality, integrity, and 
availability) in information security field.  
 
The Act requires the integrity and the availability of information systems in a closed, complete, 
consistent way, proportionate to the risks for the electronic system and components. It is important 
to explicitly include the security control implementation’s proportionality to risks and use of risk 
assessment in the state information security requirements, because security measures are typically 
implemented in an ad hoc manner, to minimize security budgets. 
 
In order to protect electronic information systems and data, proportionally to the risks, the Act 
states that the electronic information systems must be allocated to particular security classes. This 
classification is based on confidentiality, integrity and availability properties on a scale of 1 to 5, 
where 5 is the highest security level. From this section of the Act it seems that each part of CIA 
factors has to be evaluated separately, but from other parts of the Act, we don’t find this distinction. 
 
Although the security classification depends primarily on the security classification of information, 
the law, in contrast to the earlier bill, does not specify what minimal security controls should be 
applied to data. In contrast, in Section 9 (2) it determines the minimum security level classification 
for a variety of organizations. This probably will have the consequence that the security needs of 
data will not be evaluated. Instead, it will be adjusted to the security levels according to the 
minimum-list since public sector tries to spend as few as possible on security. According to the Act 
Section 7 para 5, in exceptional circumstances, the manager of the organization may set a lower 
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security class, which is another easier way to avoid spending on security. The only thing that can 
stop this expected downward bidding, the strictness of National Electronic Information Security 
Authority, based on Section 9 Para 4. The authority is formed by Act Section 14 Para 1. 
The minimum grades in the Act per organizations according to Section 9 Para 2: 
 
• Level 1: no organizations (no requirements at this level) 
• Level 2: Office of the President, Office of the National Assembly, the Constitutional Court 
's Office, Office of the Commissioner for Fundamental Rights, local and national self-
governmental bodies, the administrative authority associations 
• Level 3: central state administration bodies, the National Judicial Office, courts, prosecutors' 
offices, the State Audit Office, National Bank of Hungary, the capital city and county 
government offices 
• Level 4: Hungarian Defense Forces 
• Level 5: data processors of national data assets, European critical infrastructure system 
elements, national critical infrastructure system elements, as defined by law 
 
As we mentioned earlier, the law does not define what these security levels are, or how should the 
classification be conducted and what the detailed rules for the levels are. 
 
According to Section 11 Para 1 (c), the head of the organization is obliged to appoint a person in 
charge of the electronic information system security, who is responsible for tasks related to the 
protection of electronic information systems. The list of tasks includes responsibilities of a 
conventional chief information security officer (CISO). Its name and definition are suggesting that 
this person exempt the head of the organization and its employees from their security-related task, 
but this shouldn’t be the case. 
 
The Act set up the National Electronic Information Security Authority under the Ministry of 
National Development. As a specialized authority, National Security Authority is involved in their 
activities with forensic log analysis and vulnerability testing. The existing Government Computer 
Emergency Response Team (GovCERT) responsibilities have been migrated to the Special Service 
for National Security. According to Section 23, the National University of Public Service developed 
training for those responsible for the security of electronic information systems and staff 
organizations. 
 
After changes of political forces in the government, the topic of cybersecurity was handed over to 
Ministry of Interior with the Government Decree 187/2015. (VII. 13.). Thus the National Cyber 
Defense Institute formed in the Special Service for National Security with the following elements: 
• administration by National Electronic Information Security Authority 
• incident management and response by GovCERT-Hungary 
• forensic log analysis and vulnerability testing by National Security Authority 
This is also the actual setup as of January 2018. National Cyber Defense Institute is planned to be 
competent national authority according to NIS.17 There are four designated CSIRTs:18 LRLIBEK 
for critical infrastructures, operated by National Directorate General for Disaster Management, 
Ministry of the Interior, MILCERT operated by the Military National Security Service, Hun-CERT 
the Hungarian Computer Emergency Response Team for Council of Internet Service Providers 
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operated by the Hungarian Academy of Sciences Institute for Computer Science and Control, and 
NIIF-CSIRT, which is the Computer Security Incidents Response Team of NIIF/HUNGARNET, 
the Internet provider of universities, higher education institutes, some secondary schools, 
academical research organisations and non-profit institutions in Hungary operated by National 
Information Infrastructure Development Institute. 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
ENISA was established in 2004 as a consultative body. Both the EU and the Hungarian 
Cybersecurity Strategy was accepted in 2013. The strategies implied changes in the treatment of 
cybersecurity topic at the higher level. The objectives and tasks of ENISA have been changed, and 
the Hungarian authority was formed that year. The next hop was the NIS directive and its 
implementation in the member states’ law, which also provides reinforcement to EU legislation to 
improve ENISA.  
One of the main objectives and tasks both for ENISA and in the Hungarian regulation is the 
training. Even in the private sector, there is a huge need for well-trained IT personnel. The required 
level of training is much higher in the cybersecurity, and also real-life laboratories shall be used for 
such training.19 
Another aspect of cybersecurity is the military or cyber warfare field. Many EU members, as well 
as Hungary, is a NATO member, which shapes our defense politics more than the EU Common 
Security and Defense Policy. NATO recognized cyberspace as a ‘Domain of Operations’ at Warsaw 
Summit in 8-9 July 2016. In fact, there are also no elements, which are directly applicable at the 
member level. But the thing that cyberspace became the fifth domain of operation, and the 
requirement that all military operations shall include operations will have a positive effect on the 
defense. 
More changes happened in the previous years in the European legislation, and therefore 
preparedness to cybersecurity risk is much better nowadays, but we are lagged behind the United 
States of America and behind China.20 Thus there is a long way to go. 
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